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There are few who would venture to question the importance of the
work of Kubler-Ross concerning the stages of death,! and it is not
fully my intention to do so in this paper. That is, I do not plan to
meet her views directly with arguments opposing her clinical work.
However, it is my intention to do two things. First, I do want to show
that there are those who disagree with Kubler-Ross concerning the
stage of death, their order, and the clear manner in which they can be
distinguished. On this particular question, I will discuss Edwin S.
Shneidman's views. 2 Second, I want to indicate that, even if one has a
view of the stages of dying as Kubler-Ross delineates them, it does not
mean that all ethical dilemmas are resolved. It would, of course, be
emotionally and morally convenient if this were the case, but it is not.
The choices, I will argue, remain very difficult - for some, agonizing.
Death, of course, is a concept which for centuries has troubled the
imaginations of many. An especially excellent article which deals with
this is "Various Ways in Which Human Beings Have Sought to Reconcile Themselves to the Fact of Death" by Arnold Toynbee. 3 The
author discusses the variety of ways in which human beings have
attempted to reconcile themselves to the fact that; inevitably, they
will die. Some ways, for instance, which Toynbee (1976) mentions are
hedonism, pessimism, physical counter measures, the winning of fame,
immortality of community, personal immortality, resurrection and
heaven, in one form or another. While it is clear that human beings
have dealt with death in a variety of ways, dying has remained essentially the same. And it is toward an understanding of this process
which Kubler-Ross has made her primary and most influential contribution. (It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss or evaluate the
ontological, religious or metaphysical significance of certain dying
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experiences upon which she has concentrated much of her attention in
the last several years.)
There is no question that Kubler-Ross has made contributions of
immensely human importance to the care of the dying. Neglect and
avoidance are, at least, minimally no longer the method of professionals in dealing with individuals in the final stages of a terminal illness. Her main contribution, however, has been toward a psychological understanding of the process of dying through which the terminally ill patient passes. This psychological understanding is not
simply a theoretical exercise for her, but rather the basis for her
approach to therapy, counseling and, most important, meaningful and
ministrative support for persons moving through the loneliest experiences of human life. What she has taught us concerning the needs of
the dying and their articulation of these needs is so important that I
do not comfortably put forth the discussions in this paper, and the
criticism that will follow is tentative.
According to Kubler-Ross, the terminally-ill patient passes through
five stages in the process of dying: denial and isolation, anger, bargaining, depression and finally, acceptance. While it is true she admits that
not all patients will pass through all the stages, nor will all the patients
pass through the stages all in the same order, it is clear that she thinks
all patients ought to pass through the stages and that the last stage,
acceptance, has special significance. She also clearly regards each stage
as having an appropriate "therapeutic" response. To all of this I shall
return shortly.
Stage one, denial and isolation, gives the patient necessary time to
gather and collect the self and mobilize other, less radical defenses.
Kubler-Ross writes, "Denial is usually a temporary defense and will
soon be replaced by partial acceptance. Maintained denial does not
always bring increased distress if it holds out until the end, which I
consider a rarity. Among our two hundred terminally ill patients, I
have encountered only three who attempted to deny its approach
until the very last" (1969, p. 40).
Stage two, anger, is the stage when patients are at their most difficult. They provoke, among the st.aff, rejection and fear at the precise
time, ironically, when they most require help. Here Kubler-Ross
writes, "They fight it to the end and often miss an opportunity for
reaching a humble acceptance of death as a final outcome. They provoke rejection and anger, and are yet the most desperate of all" (1969,
p.56).
Bargaining is the third stage. The patient tries to make some kind of
arrangement in an attempt to postpone death, at this point understood to be, ultimately, inevitable. Things in a material sense are
offered and arrangements are made, in an exchange for time.
The fourth stage is depression, two kinds of which Kubler-Ross
actually distinguishes. The first is reactive depression. Kubler-Ross
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writes, "When the terminally ill patient can no longer deny his illness
... he cannot smile it off anymore. His numbness or stoicism, his
anger and rage will soon be replaced with a sense of great loss" (1969,
p. 85). Reactive depression sets in with the patient's recognition of
past loss. The second kind of depression, preparatory depression,
occurs as 'me begins to prepare for separation from the world. This is
a critical stage, according to Kubler-Ross, and one in which the patient
should not be given encouragement. Such empty optimism, KublerRoss suggests, reflects "our own needs, our own inability to tolerate a
long face for any extended period of time" (1969, p. 87).
The final stage is acceptance. The patient is not happy and is devoid
of feelings, as if the pain is gone, the struggle over. Kubler-Ross writes,
"While the dying patient has found some peace and acceptance, his
circle of interest diminishes. He wishes to be left alone or at least not
be stirred up by news and problems of the outside world. Visitors are
often not desired and if they come, the patient is no longer in a talkative mood" (1969, p. 113).
I intend to return to discuss a particularly significant question that
may be involved in the stages I have just outlined, but I first want to
discuss the views of one other individual concerning the dying process
and the problem of designating and identifying the emotions that
accompany it.
Schneidman's Writings
Edwin S. Schneidman, Ph.D. professor of thanatology and director
of the Laboratory for Life-Threatening Behavior at the University of
California at Los Angeles, writes as follows: "My own work has not
led me to conclusions identical with those of Kubler-Ross. Indeed,
while I have seen in dying persons isolation, envy, bargaining, depression and acceptance, I do not believe that these are necessary 'stages'
of the dying process, and I am not all convinced that they are lived
through in that order, or, for that matter, in any universal order"
(1976, p. 446). He continues, "What I do see is a complicated clustering of intellectual and affective states, some fleeting, lasting for a
moment or a day or a week, set, not unexpectedly, against the backdrop of that person's total personality, his 'philosophy of life' .. . . "
Then he asks: "What of that nexus of emotions manifested by the
dying person?" He responds to his own question: "Rather than the
five definite stages discussed above, my experience leads me to posit a
hive of effect, in which there is constant coming and going. The
emotional stages seem to include a constant interplay between disbelief and hope and, against these as background, a waxing and waning
of anguish, terror, disinterest and ennui, pretense, taunting and daring
and even yearning for death - all these in the context of bewilderment and pain" (1976, pp. 446-447). And then Shneidman concludes:
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"One does not find a unidirectional movement through progressive
stages so much as an alternation between acceptance and denial" (p.
447).
It is clear that Shneidman's views concerning the stages of dying are
quite different from those of Kubler-Ross. In fact, from Shneidman's
perspective, it is not clear that the dying experience takes place in
"stages" at all. And the implication of this is that, in the clinical
setting, the behavior, emotions, and responses of patients may not be
effectively predicted. There may be real confusion, consternation,
puzzlement and even error among those treating the dying. In fact, a
good part of Shneidman's article concerns possible approaches to therapeutic assistance for those who do work with the dying. For instance,
he writes, "The physician would do well ... to interact intensively
with a few, perhaps only one dying patient at a time ... [since] a
physician needs to take vacations from death. A gynecological oncologist, for example, should intersperse his practice with obstetrical cases,
delivering babies as a balance for others of his patients who are
dying.. . . " (1976, p . 450).
It is not my purpose to ask whether Kubler-Ross or Shneidman is
correct in her or his assessment of the relevance of "stages to a
description of the dying process for the terminally ill. I am not a
psychologist. I have no clinical experience, but I wish to make the
point that there may be no clinical basis for resolving the issue. In
other words, it may not be a clinical or empirical issue, but a conceptual one. Kubler-Ross herself asks the question when, concerning the
acceptance stage, she writes: "How, then, do we know when a patient
is giving up 'too early,' when we feel that a little fight on his part combined with the help of the medical profession could give him a chance
to live longer?"(1969, p. 114). Her answer is not explicit, but the
implication appears to be that her whole book, detailing a significant
amount of clinical experience, is the answer. Through her clinical
experience, the stages emerge and they are recommended on this basis.
Shneidman's clinical work, however, leads to the opposite view, that
one should focus not on any stage-like, unidirectional process of
dying, but on the individual patient, "treating that person as a paradigm of all .. . dying patients" (1976, p. 450). Even if one were to
accept the book On Death and Dying as Kubler-Ross's answer to her
own question concerning the accurate identification of the stages and
ascription of emotion for the purpose of approaching the patient with
the "right" therapy, it is possible to press the conceptual questions
further. This seems to be especially necessary in light of Shneidman's
views resulting from his clinical experience.
The particular sort of case that illustrates what ultimately seems to
be a conceptual dilemma is as follows: a woman, from the interpretive
perspective of the physician, has been judged to have passed from
denial, to anger, to bargaining, to depression, and is now, according to
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Kubler-Ross, in that very critical stage of moving from reactive depression to preparatory depression. The physician informs the woman's
husband of this, and also strongly advises him that it is very important
that he now leave her undisturbed, in order to let this stage develop
fully . He should not encourage her to continue the struggle against
dying.
Two Possible Problems
At this point, it seems to me, there are at least two possible problems. The first is that, if Shneidman is correct, then identifying what
stage the woman is in, predicting what stage will follow , and advising
an "appropriate" response, are all problematic. It may be that this particular woman needs to know that someone cares and needs and wants
the encouragement that her husband can give her. And it may be that
fighting the dying process in this instance will meaningfully prolong
the life of the woman. This is the difficult problem of ascribing a particular emotion to a particular patient, as well as of predicting pattern
and process of emotional change in particular circumstances.
The second problem is more general but relates directly to the problem of ascribing emotion in any single instance. All will agree that it
would be extremely helpful were it truly possible to understand fully
the psychology of the dying, if we could predict with confidence the
emotions, the feelings of those passing through the physical stages of
terminal illness. It would make it so much more possible for us to
respond with confidence that what we are doing is, without any doubt
whatsoever, the right response. This would be a wonderful way to feel,
emotionally beneficial to ourselves, as well as to the patient and the
patient's family. But no matter how much we may wish that we c ould
have this knowledge, to be able to establish without question the
presence of a particular emotion in a patient, indicating how we
should respond (whether it be to encourage or to withdraw), there
does not seem to be any final way to demonstrate this. One, I think,
must admit the difficulty in establishing sufficient and necessary evidence to support the judgment that there is present in a particular
patient the emotion of preparatory depression which would give an
individual permission not to encourage such a patient. In other words,
because of this conceptual difficulty, the moral dilemma is not alleviated. This painstaking and well-intentioned attempt to provide a
psychological map of the emotions of the dying does not afford us the
certainty that our actions are correct. It is still, ultimately, a matter of
choice, and the situation is extremely difficult. The husband, no
matter what the physician advises, will have doubts about his choice.
The possibilities for guilt, remorse or regret are enormous. What is the
moral status of the act in the husband's mind at this point? Allowing
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to die? Killing? Abandonment? What is the moral status of the act in
reality? Has the physician interpreted the situation correctly? How
certain are the results and conclusions of Kubler-Ross's investigations?
These are agonizing questions that do not have, it appears, simple,
clinically established answers. The physician must ask himself or herself, how does one ultimately distinguish between working the patient
helpfully and carefully through the stages of dying and possibly, but
not intentionally, manipulating the patient through the stages of
dying?
It may be that these are problems which have special significance
primarily within the setting of the institution. It may be observed outside the hospital or hospice, and in the home where the patient is on
his or her own ground, that the patient will pass not so predictably
through the "stages." In the home there is obviously not the same
"institutional" concern for the convenience of having a "good"
patient, one who does not pose difficult demands on the limited time
of the staff, however dedicated it may be (and this is not at all the
question). If this is the case, it would follow that, within the institution, special care and attention ought to be directed toward determining that there is no coercion, however slight, no pressure, however
subtle, and no manipulation, however well-intentioned. It is probably
true that aside from possibly and even unconsciously wanting a manageable patient, the staff would also like to have a patient who accepts
that for which it is preparing him or her. Such acceptance would
mean, from the perspective of Kubler-Ross, that the staff has done its
work well. This would be more emotionally satisfying, and of course
no one would want to deny the staff this small satisfaction which is so
important in the area in which it works, where success is measured by
the sort of death the patient has, and never by recovery. However, in a
particular case acceptance may not occur, and a patient may remain
angry or depressed. This, I think one must agree, is the patient's right,
and this right must be respected.
To conclude, there may be no solution for the dilemma I have discussed. However, the dilemma may resolve itself as attention is
directed toward a softening of the institution's demands, giving
patients the increased freedom and encouragement to express themselves.
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